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I suggest that the “B” in QBism should stand for Bohr. The paper begins by
explaining why Bohr seems obscure to most physicists. Having identified the
contextuality of physical quantities as Bohr’s essential contribution to Kant’s
theory of science, I outline the latter, its proper contextuality, and its de-
contextualization. After emphasizing the important difference between three
kinds of realism (one good, one bad, one ugly), I discuss an important change
in Bohr’s vocabulary: in order to preserve the decontextualization of Kant’s
theory, he moved from talking about “our forms of perception” (Kant’s pure
forms of intuition) to talking about experimental arrangements, and he sub-
stituted phenomena for objects as the principal referents of atomic physics,
all the while keeping the universal context of human experience at the center
of his philosophy. QBism, through its emphasis on the individual experiencing
subject, brings home the intersubjective constitution of objectivity more force-
fully than Bohr did. If measurements are irreversible and outcomes definite, it
is because the experiences of each subject are irreversible and definite. Bohr,
on the other hand, gave us all the arguments we need to extend to the objective
world the irreversibility of measurements and the definiteness of outcomes.
Keywords: Bohr; contextuality; decontextualization; intersubjective constitu-
tion of objectivity; Kant; QBism.
1. Introduction
I have this “madly optimistic” (Mermin called it) feeling that
Bohrian–Paulian ideas will lead us to the next stage of physics. That
is, that thinking about quantum foundations from their point of view
will be the beginning of a new path, not the end of an old one.
— Christopher A. Fuchs1
The beginning of the 21st Century saw the launch of a novel interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger
Schack.2 Initially conceived as an extended personalist Bayesian theory of
probability called “Quantum Bayesianism,” it has since been re-branded
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as “QBism,” the term David Mermin3 prefers, considering it “as big a
break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was
with 19th century ways of thinking about art.” The big break lies not in
the emphasis that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics is
a probability calculus—that ought to surprise no one—but in this plus a
radically subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability plus a radically
subjective interpretation of the events to which (and on the basis of which)
probabilities are assigned.
Recently the referent of the “B” in QBism became moot. While Mermin4
suggested that it should stand for Bruno de Finetti (“Quantum Brunoism”),
Chris Fuchs and Blake Stacey5 suggested that it should stand for Betta-
bilitarianism. This word was coined by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., about
whom Louis Menand wrote (as quoted by Fuchs and Stacey):
Complete certainty was an illusion; of that he was certain. There
were only greater and lesser degrees of certainty, and that was
enough. It was, in fact, better than enough; for although we always
want to reduce the degree of uncertainty in our lives, we never want
it to disappear entirely, since uncertainty is what puts the play in
the joints. Imprecision, the sportiveness, as it were, of the quantum,
is what makes life interesting and change possible. Holmes liked to
call himself a “bettabilitarian”: we cannot know what consequences
the universe will attach to our choices, but we can bet on them,
and we do it every day.
With the present paper, I vote that the “B” in QBism should stand for
Niels Bohr.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why Bohr nowa-
days seems obscure to most physicists. Section 3 identifies the contextuality
of physical quantities as Bohr’s essential contribution to Kant’s theory of
science. (Affinities between Bohr’s theory of science and Kant’s have been
noted by a number of scholars.6–15) Section 4 outlines Kant’s theory of sci-
ence, its contextuality, and its decontextualization. Section 5 distinguishes
three kinds of realism: the “good” (internal) realism of Kant and Bohr, the
“bad” naive realism, which deems either measuring instruments or quan-
tum states to be mind-independently real, and the “ugly” realism that is
associated with the representative theory of perception. Section 6 discusses
an important change in Bohr’s vocabulary: in order to preserve the decon-
textualization of Kant’s theory, he moved from talking about “our forms
of perception” to talking about experimental arrangements. In line with
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this, as discussed in Sec. 7, he substituted phenomena for objects as the
principal referents of atomic physics.
The conceptual framework staked out by Kant, which provides the gen-
eral structure for a language of objects that is independent of subjects, is the
very framework that undergirds the “plain, unambiguous language” on the
use of which Bohr so forcefully insisted. It is therefore an irony that Bohr,
seeing Kant as arguing for the necessary validity and the unlimited reach
of classical concepts, regarded complementarity as an alternative to Kant’s
theory of science. While Kant did not anticipate the possibility of an em-
pirical knowledge that did not involve the organization of sense-impressions
into objects—an empirical knowledge that was therefore beyond the reach
of classical concepts—he was absolutely right in insisting on the necessary
validity of classical concepts, and so was Bohr. This is discussed in Sec. 8.
Section 9 briefly surveys the philosophically rather barren period between
the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism.
The discussion of QBism begins in Sec. 10, with particular focus on
Wigner’s conundrum regarding himself and his friend, the Heisenberg cut
(Bell’s shifty split), and QBists’ less than consistent use of “the (objective
or external) world.” Sometimes the phrase refers to “the common external
world we have all negotiated with each other,” and othertimes it refers to
“the world as it is without agents.” QBists see only one alternative to plac-
ing the Heisenberg cut inside the objective world, which is to place it at
the boundary between the subject and its objects. In Sec. 11 I argue that
there is another alternative, which is to place it at the boundary between
“the common external world we have all negotiated with each other” and
“the world as it is without agents.” By doing so one avoids coherent super-
positions of outcome-indicating properties without falling into Bell’s “fapp
trap.” The concluding section contains some quibbles about QBist mis-
representations of Bohr’s philosophy, the role of language, and the strange
claim that quantum mechanics is explicitly local in the QBist interpreta-
tion. To make this claim is to concede way too much to those who fancy
themselves as modeling a reality not of their own making. QBism is neither
local nor nonlocal in the realist’s sense of these terms. An outline of the
more technical aspect of QBism is provided as an appendix.
While Bohr never lost sight of the universal context of human experi-
ence, QBism, through its emphasis on the individual experiencing subject,
brings home the intersubjective constitution of our common external world
more forcefully than Bohr did. If measurements are irreversible and out-
comes definite, it is because the experiences of each subject are irreversible
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and definite. Bohr, on the other hand, gave us all the arguments we need
(and QBism so far lacks) to extend to our common external world the
irreversibility of measurements and the definiteness of outcomes.
2. Why Bohr seems obscure
As a philosopher Niels Bohr was either one of the great visionary
figures of all time, or merely the only person courageous enough to
confront head on, whether or not successfully, the most imponderable
mystery we have yet unearthed. — N. David Mermin16
Today, Bohr seems obscure to most physicists. Catherine Chevalley17 has
identified three reasons why. The first is that Bohr’s views have come to
be equated with one variant or another of the Copenhagen interpretation,
which only emerged in the mid-1950’s, in response to David Bohm’s hidden-
variables theory and the Marxist critique of Bohr’s alleged idealism, which
had inspired Bohm. The second is that Bohr’s readers will usually not find
in his writings what they expected to find, while they will find a number
of things that they did not expect. What they expect is a take on the mea-
surement problem, the so-called Heisenberg cut, the quantum-to-classical
transition, locality, etc. What they find instead is discussions of philosoph-
ical issues such as the meaning of “objectivity,” of “reality,” of “truth,” the
role of language etc. Bohr’s thinking is situated in a complex and diverse
epistemological context that developed in Germany starting with Immanuel
Kant. In this context, the fundamental problem was: how are phenomena
given to us in intuition, and how do we build objects starting from what is
given to us?
The third reason is that the task of making sense of quantum mechanics
is seen today as one of grafting a metaphysical narrative onto a mathemat-
ical formalism, in a language that is philosophically vague enough to allow
for general understanding. For Bohr, as also for Werner Heisenberg and
Wolfgang Pauli, the real issues lay deeper. They judged that the concep-
tual difficulties posed by quantum mechanics called in question the general
framework of thought, its concepts, and its criteria of consistency.
3. Contextuality
Immanuel Kant, the most important philosopher of the modern era, demon-
strated that it was possible to provide a scientific theory with much stronger
justification than mere empirical adequacy. The kind of argument inaugu-
rated by him to this end begins by assuming that a certain proposition p is
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true, and then shows that another proposition q, stating a precondition for
the truth of p, must also be true. For him, the relevant proposition p was
the assumption that empirical knowledge was possible, and the correspond-
ing proposition q was the conclusion that certain universal laws of nature
must hold. One such law was that “[a]ll alterations occur in accordance
with the law of the connection of cause and effect”.18
“Reason,” Kant wrote, “must approach nature with its principles in one
hand . . . and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance
with these principles.” The law of universal causation is such a principle.
The principles are formulated using concepts whose meanings are rooted in
our cognitive faculties of intuitiona and thought. If experiments are thought
out in accordance with them, then we are in a position to understand
nature’s answers: “what reason would not be able to know of itself and
has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter” but it has to do this
“in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature”.19
What Kant did not anticipate was that experiments might not merely
serve to provide intelligible answers but themselves play the defining roles
he ascribed to our cognitive faculties—that they were needed not only to
answer but also to ask meaningful questions. The insight that certain ques-
tions are contextual—that they are meaningless without the experimental
arrangements by which answers are elicited—is due to Bohr.b His thesis
that, out of relation to experimental arrangements, physical quantities are
undefined, has been spectacularly borne out by the no-go theorems of John
Bell,21 Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker,22 and Alexander Klyachko and
coworkers.23
4. Decontextualization
Bohr’s contextuality, however, was not the first to play an important role in
natural philosophy. From the end of the 17th century onwards, it was widely
accepted by philosophers that objects existed relative to a context, to wit,
human experience. By placing the subject of empirical science squarely
into the context of human experience, Kant dispelled many qualms that
had been shared by thinkers at the end of the 18th century—qualms about
the objective nature of geometry, about the purely mathematical nature
aThe German original, Anschauung, covers both visual perception and visual imagina-
tion.
bAnd the insight that contextuality is Bohr’s essential contribution of Kant’s theory of
science is due to Michel Bitbol.20
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of Newton’s theory, about the unintelligibility of action at a distance, and
about Galileo’s principle of relativity.
Concerning the laws of geometry, which apply to objects constructed by
us in the space of our imagination, the question was why they should also
apply to the physical world. Kant’s answer was that they apply to objects
perceived as well as to objects imagined because visual perception and vi-
sual imagination share the same space.c As to the mathematical nature of
Newtonian mechanics, it was justified, not by the Neo-Platonic belief that
the book of nature was written in mathematical language, but by its being
a precondition of scientific knowledge. What makes it possible to conceive
of appearances as aspects of an objective world is the mathematical regu-
larities that obtain between them. Newton’s refusal to explain action at a
distance was similarly justified, inasmuch as the only intelligible causality
available to us consists in lawful mathematical relations between phenom-
ena: for the Moon to be causally related to the Earth was for the Moon
to stand in a regular mathematical relation to the Earth. As to the prin-
ciple of relativity, ditto: lawful mathematical relations only exist between
phenomena, and thus only between objects or objective events, but never
between a particular phenomenon and space or time itself.d
Kant’s premise was that “space and time are only forms of sensible
intuition, and therefore only conditions of the existence of the things as
appearances.” It follows
that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no el-
ements for the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition
can be given corresponding to these concepts, consequently that
we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only
insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance;
from which follows the limitation of all even possible speculative
cognition of reason to mere objects of experience. Yet . . . even if we
cannot cognize these same objects as [i.e., know them to be] things
cIt is noteworthy that Kant’s argument applies, not to Euclidean geometry specifically,
even though it was the only geometry known in Kant’s time, but to geometry in general,
and thus to whichever geometry is best suited to formulating the laws of physics. It has
even been said that Kant’s theory of science set in motion a series of re-conceptualizations
of the relationship between geometry and physics that eventuated in Einstein’s theories
of relativity.24
dHere, too, it would be an anachronism to argue that Kant singled out Galilean relativity,
even though it was the only relativity known in his time. His argument holds for every
possible principle of relativity, including Einstein’s.
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in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in
themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposi-
tion that there is an appearance without anything that appears.25
Before Kant, there appears to have been no philosopher who did not have
a correspondence theory of truth, and who did not think of the relation of
sense impressions to the external world as a relation of similarity—hence the
aforementioned qualms shared by thinkers at the end of the 18th century.
Kant showed that the predictive success of a scientific theory does not have
to be attributed to some empirically inaccessible correspondence between
the structure of the theory and the structure of the real world. He did this
by establishing a far-reaching dependence of scientific concepts on human
intuition and the logical structure of our thought.
Needless to say, this had to be done without calling into question the
objectivity of science, and thus in a way that allowed people to think of
phenomena as appearances of things “out there.” We must be able to de-
contextualize the objective world, to forget that it depends on us. And if
there is only the single universal context of human experience, it is easily
done. We are free to think of perceived objects as faithful representations
of real objects (things in themselves). We are free to forget that the re-
lations holding between them owe their spatiotemporal qualities or their
space/time-related meanings to our mental faculties. This is how it came
about that, by the end of the 19th century, Kant’s theory of science had
squelched most skeptical scruples about the reality of the external world.
5. Realism good, bad, and ugly
In an essay written during the last year of his life,26 Erwin Schro¨dinger
expressed his astonishment at the fact that despite “the absolute hermetic
separation of my sphere of consciousness” from everyone else’s, there is “a
far-reaching structural similarity between certain parts of our experiences,
the parts which we call external; it can be expressed in the brief statement
that we all live in the same world.” This similarity, Schro¨dinger avowed, “is
not rationally comprehensible. In order to grasp it we are reduced to two
irrational, mystical hypotheses,” one of whiche is “the so-called hypothesis
of the real external world.” Schro¨dinger left no room for uncertainty about
what he thought of this hypothesis. To invoke “the existence of a real world
eThe alternative hypothesis, which he endorsed, was “that we are all really only various
aspects of the One”.27
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of bodies which are the causes of sense-impressions and produce roughly
the same impression on everybody . . . is not to give an explanation at all;
it is simply to state the matter in different words. In fact, it means lay-
ing a completely useless burden on the understanding.” It means uselessly
translating the statement “everybody agrees about something” into the
statement “there exists a real world which causes everybody’s agreement.”
Instead of explaining the fact expressed by the first statement, the second
merely reinforces its incomprehensibility, for the relation between this pos-
tulated real world and those aspects of our experiences about which there
is agreement, is something we cannot know. The causal relations we know
are internal to those parts of our experiences about which we agree.
In ancient and medieval philosophy, to be was either to be a substance
or to be a property of a substance. Substance was self-existent; everything
else depended on a substance for its existence. With Descartes, the human
conscious subject assumed the role of substance: to be became either to be
a subject or to exist as a representation for a subject. Thus was born the
representative theory of perception, and with it the aforesaid burden on the
understanding. In the eyes of philosopher John Searle, the move from the
older view that “we really perceive real objects” to the view that we only
perceive sense-impressions was “the greatest single disaster in the history
of philosophy over the past four centuries”.28 A disaster it was indeed,
not least because it continues to muddy most scientific accounts of sensory
perception.f
The representative theory of perception poses this dilemma: either the
gap between representations and the objects they are supposed to rep-
resent can never be bridged, or the world is reduced to representations.
Either science deals with objects in the real world, in which case we have
no justifiable idea of how we come to have representations, or it deals with
representations, in which case we have no justifiable knowledge of the real
fSuch accounts tend to begin by assuming the existence of a mind-independent external
world, in which objects emit photons and/or sound waves, which stimulate peripheral
nerve endings (retinas or ear drums). The stimulated nerves then send signals to the
brain, where neural processes miraculously give rise to perceptual experience. The plain
truth is that nobody knows how to bridge this “explanatory gap”.29 “Nobody has the
slightest idea how anything material could be conscious. Nobody even knows what it
would be like to have the slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious.
So much for the philosophy of consciousness.” These words ring as true in 2019 as they
did in 1992, when they were written by Jerry Fodor.30 While said accounts begin by
assuming that science talks about events in a mind-independent external world, they
lead to the conclusion that we have access only to perceptual experience, and that there
is no way we could ever have access to that external world.
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world. Transcendental philosophy, inaugurated by Kant and continued in
the 20th century by Edmund Husserl,31 emerged as a critique of the repre-
sentative theory. In an attempt to defend the older, direct realism, Searle
has invoked the fact that we are able communicate with other human be-
ings, using publicly available meanings in a public language. For this to
work, he argues,32 we have to assume common, publicly available objects
of reference:
So, for example, when I use the expression “this table” I have to
assume that you understand the expression in the same way that I
intend it. I have to assume we are both referring to the same table,
and when you understand me in my utterance of “this table” you
take it as referring to the same object you refer to in this context
in your utterance of “this table.”
The implication then is that
you and I share a perceptual access to one and the same object.
And that is just another way of saying that I have to presuppose
that you and I are both seeing or otherwise perceiving the same
public object. But that public availability of that public world is
precisely the direct realism that I am here attempting to defend.
Searle points out that his argument is transcendental in Kant’s sense. Here
p is the assumption that we are able to communicate with each other in a
public language, and q is the conclusion that there must be publicly avail-
able objects in a public world about which we can communicate in a public
language. The actual implication of his argument, however, is the agreement
between our respective “spheres of consciousness”—between what exists for
me, in my experience, and what exists for you, in your experience—which
so astonished Schro¨dinger. It allows us to communicate with each other
as if direct realism were true. What Searle succeeds in defending against
the “ugly” representative realism is not the “bad” direct realism but the
“good” internal realism of the transcendental philosophers (to use a term
coined by Hilary Putnam33) .
The key role language plays in establishing the rationally incomprehensi-
ble correspondence between the “external parts” of our internal experiences,
was also emphasized by Schro¨dinger:
What does establish it is language, including everything in the way
of expression, gesture, taking hold of another person, pointing with
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one’s finger and so forth, though none of this breaks through that
inexorable, absolute division between spheres of consciousness.26
6. From forms of perception to experimental arrangements
The hallmark of empirical knowledge is objectivity. To Kant, objectivity
meant two things: intersubjective agreement, and the possibility of thinking
of appearances as experiences of objects. His inquiry into the preconditions
of empirical science was essentially an inquiry into the preconditions of
the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects. And in the new
domain opened up by quantum mechanics this possibility no longer exists.
As Schro¨dinger34 wrote,
Atoms—our modern atoms, the ultimate particles—must no longer
be regarded as identifiable individuals. This is a stronger deviation
from the original idea of an atom than anybody had ever contem-
plated. We must be prepared for anything.
For the present-day physicist, it is not easy to understand the bewilderment
that the founders and their contemporaries experienced in the early days
of the quantum theory:
All the verities of the preceding two centuries, held by physicists
and ordinary people alike, simply fell apart—collapsed. We had to
start all over again, and we came up with something that worked
just beautifully but was so strange that nobody had any idea what
it meant except Bohr, and practically nobody could understand
him. So naturally we kept probing further, getting to smaller and
smaller length scales, waiting for the next revolution to shed some
light on the meaning of the old one.35
That revolution never came. Quantummechanics works as beautifully in the
nucleus as it does in the atom; and it works as beautifully in the nucleon as
it does in the nucleus, seven or eight orders of magnitude below the level for
which it was designed. (It also works beautifully many orders of magnitude
above that level, as for example in a superconductor.)
But should this surprise us? The alternative is between contextuality
and decontextualization, and those who hope to salvage decontextualiza-
tion (which has never been more than an “as if”) are beating a dead horse.
The question is not (nor ever was or will be): how do we get from mathemat-
ical symbols, conceived as representations of a mind-independent reality, to
physics laboratories, to people, and to subjects experiencing an objective
May 20, 2019 0:31 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in B4Bohr
11
world? The question was (and remains): how does the reality of atomic
phenomena differ from the reality of the experimental procedures by which
evidence about atomic phenomena is gained?
“Without sensibility no object would be given to us,” Kant wrote,36
“and without understanding none would be thought.” Bohr could not have
agreed more, insisting as he did that meaningful physical concepts have
not only mathematical but also visualizable content. Such concepts are as-
sociated with pictures, like the picture of a particle following a trajectory
or the picture of a wave propagating in space. In the classical theory, a
single picture could accommodate all of the properties a system can have.
When quantum theory came along, that all-encompassing picture fell apart,
much to everyone’s consternation. Unless certain experimental conditions
obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as following a trajec-
tory (which was nevertheless a routine presupposition in setting up Stern–
Gerlach experiments and in interpreting cloud-chamber photographs), and
there was no way in which to apply the concept of position. And unless
certain other, incompatible, experimental conditions obtained, it was im-
possible to picture the electron as a traveling wave (which was nevertheless
a routine presupposition in interpreting the scattering of electrons by crys-
tals), and there was no way in which to apply the concept of momentum.
Bohr settled on the nexus between pictures, physical concepts, and ex-
perimental arrangements as key to “the task of bringing order into an en-
tirely new field of experience”.37 If the visualizable content of physical con-
cepts cannot be described in terms of compatible pictures, it has to be
described in terms of something that can be so described, and what can
be so described are the incompatible experimental conditions under which
the incompatible physical concepts can be employed. The incompatibility
of experimental arrangements implies “a complementarity of the possibil-
ities of definition”,38 and for this reason “the specification of [the whole
experimental arrangement] is imperative for any well-defined application of
the quantum-mechanical formalism”.37
The transition from pictures to experimental arrangements did not hap-
pen overnight. In his earlier writings, Bohr made frequent reference to “our
forms of perception”: “we must remember, above all, that, as a matter of
course, all new experience makes its appearance within the frame of our
customary points of view and forms of perception”;39 “at the same time as
every doubt regarding the reality of atoms has been removed, . . . we have
been reminded in an instructive manner of the natural limitation of our
forms of perception”;40 “the difficulties concerning our forms of perception,
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which arise in the atomic theory. . . , may be considered as an instructive
reminder of the general conditions underlying the creation of man’s con-
cepts”.41 What Bohr meant by “our forms of perceptions” may be gleaned
from a 1922 letter to his philosophical mentor Harald Høffding: “my per-
sonal opinion is that these difficulties are of such a kind that they hardly
allow us to hope, within the world of atoms, to implement a description in
space and time of the kind corresponding to our usual sensory images”.42
What Bohr meant was what Kant had referred to as the “pure forms of
intuition.”
Over time Bohr realized that it was more expedient to defend the objec-
tivity of the quantum theory with references to “experimental conditions”
or “arrangements” than with references to “pictures,” “sensory images,” or
“forms of perception.” As Jørgen Kalckar remarked,43
when the phrase “forms of perception” was replaced by “exper-
imental arrangement”, “the objectivity of physical observations”
could be stressed without the somewhat bewildering addition that
it could be “particularly suited to emphasize the subjective char-
acter of all experience.”
It is certainly easier to digest a statement like “the objective character of
the description in atomic physics depends on the detailed specification of
the experimental conditions under which evidence is gained”,44 but it is
also easier to misconstrue such a statement as endorsing not the intended
internal realism but a direct realism (or worse) with regard to measuring
instruments.
7. From objects to phenomena
In the new domain opened up by quantum mechanics, the possibility of
organizing sense-impressions into objects, which for Kant was a precondi-
tion of the possible of empirical knowledge, does not exist. In this domain
there are no sense impressions waiting to be organized into objects. In one
sense, therefore, we know less: what is inaccessible to our senses cannot
be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal conditions of human expe-
rience, and therefore cannot be expected to be expressible by means of
concepts that owe their visualizable content to these conditions.g But in
gWhile position and orientation are in an obvious sense visualizable, linear and angular
momentum derive their meanings from the symmetry properties of space or the invari-
ant behavior of closed systems under translations and rotations, and energy derives its
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another sense we know more: “the mutual exclusion of any two experimen-
tal procedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complementary
physical quantities, . . . provides room for new physical laws”.45 What Bohr
added to Kant’s theory of science was his insight that empirical knowledge
was not necessarily limited to what is directly accessible to our senses, and
that, therefore, it does not have to be solely a knowledge of (re-identifiable)
objects and causally connected events.
However, since “the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum
theory . . . lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception”,46 all
we have to describe these facts is “a purely symbolic scheme permitting only
predictions . . . as to results obtainable under conditions specified by means
of classical concepts”.47 Bohr’s emphatic rejection of the familiar language
of objects when dealing with these facts cannot be overemphasized. There is
no object to be disturbed, and no object which measurements could furnish
with attributes:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are con-
fronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as re-
gards all questions of terminology. Speaking, as is often done, of
disturbing a phenomenon by observation, or even of creating physi-
cal attributes to objects by measuring processes, is, in fact, liable to
be confusing, since all such sentences imply a departure from basic
conventions of language which, even though it sometimes may be
practical for the sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. It is cer-
tainly far more in accordance with the structure and interpretation
of the quantum mechanical symbolism, as well as with elementary
epistemological principles, to reserve the word “phenomenon” for
the comprehension of the effects observed under given experimental
conditions.48
“These conditions,” Bohr goes on to say, “which include the account of
the properties and manipulation of all measuring instruments essentially
concerned, constitute in fact the only basis for the definition of the con-
cepts by which the phenomenon is described.” The definite definition of
“phenomenon,” which takes over when phenomena in the older sense of
the term do not exist or cannot be organized into objects, is given in the
following passage:
meaning from the uniformity of time or the invariant behavior of closed systems under
time translations.
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all unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formal-
ism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the
initial state of the atomic system concerned and the character of
the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable proper-
ties of that system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in
fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial state or to the test
of such predictions, and it is first the combination of measurements
of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.49
Where there is no object that can be disturbed, where even the dichotomy
of objects and attributes created for them by measuring processes is sus-
pect, the very dichotomy of physical system and experimental arrangement
becomes suspect. Not only the measured properties but the systems them-
selves are defined by the experimental conditions under which they are
observed.h
Bohr sometimes spoke of “irreversible amplification effects.” This sug-
gests that something reversible is going on beneath or behind the phenom-
ena, which has to be (as John Wheeler51 put it) “brought to a close by an
irreversible act of amplification such as the blackening of a grain of silver
bromide emulsion or the triggering of a photodetector.” But this is to take
the view of the “Newmanniac,” who transmogrifies statistical laws corre-
lating observations into physical processes interspersed with observations,
or the view of the “Ψ-ontologist,” who aims to reify such laws into phys-
ical processes giving rise to observations. For Bohr, nothing is going on
between “the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state
of the atomic system concerned” and “the subsequent observable properties
of that system.” What makes the so-called amplification effects irreversible
is “the irreversibility in principle of the very notion of observation”,52 “the
essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation”,53 and
by this he meant the incontestably irreversible definiteness of human sen-
hIn her commendable monograph Particle Metaphysics,50 Brigitte Falkenburg writes:
“only the experimental context (and our ways of conceiving of it in classical terms)
makes it possible to talk in a sloppy way of quantum objects. . . . Bare quantum ‘objects’
are just bundles of properties which underlie superselection rules and which exhibit
non-local, acausal correlations. . . . They seem to be Lockean empirical substances, that
is, collections of empirical properties which constantly go together. However, they are
only individuated by the experimental apparatus in which they are measured or the
concrete quantum phenomenon to which they belong. . . . They can only be individuated
as context-dependent quantum phenomena. Without a given experimental context, the
reference of quantum concepts goes astray. In this point, Bohr is absolutely right up to
the present day.”
May 20, 2019 0:31 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in B4Bohr
15
sory experience, as distinct from the irreversibility of hypothetical processes
leading to permanent marks existing out of relation to human sensory ex-
perience.
8. Concepts and language
As Schro¨dinger correctly stressed, the existence of a public world, about
which we are able to communicate with each other in a public language,
cannot be rationally explained. We may, however, ask: what is it about our
experience that makes it an experience of a public world?
In answer, Kant might have pointed out that we share the logical struc-
ture of a common language and the spatiotemporal structure of a common
intuition. The logical relation between a (logical) subject and a predicate
makes it possible for us to think of a particular nexus of perceptions as the
properties of a substance, connected to it as predicates are connected to a
subject. It makes it possible for me to think of perceptions as connected not
by me, in my experience, but in an object “out there” in the public world.
The logical relation between antecedent and consequent (if . . . then. . . )
makes it possible for us to think of what we perceive at different times
as properties of substances connected by causality. It makes it possible for
me to think of asynchronous perceptions as connected not merely in my
experience but also objectively, by a causal nexus “out there.” And the
category of community or reciprocity, which Kant associated with the dis-
junctive relation (either. . . or. . . ), makes it possible for us to think of what
we perceive in different locations as properties of substances connected by
a reciprocal action. It makes it possible for me to think of simultaneous
perceptions as connected not only in my experience but objectively. (Kant
thought that by establishing a reciprocal relation, we establish not only an
objective spatial relation but also an objective relation of simultaneity.)
But to be able to think of perceptions as properties of substances, or
as causally connected, or as affecting each other, the connections must be
regular. For perceptions to be perceptions of a particular kind of thing
(say, an elephant), they must be connected in an orderly way, according
to a concept denoting a lawful concurrence of perceptions. For perceptions
to be causally connected, like (say) lightning and thunder, they must fall
under a causal law, according to which one perception necessitates the
subsequent occurrence of another. (By establishing a causal relation falling
under a causal law, we also establish an objective temporal relation.) And
for perceptions to be reciprocally connected, like (say) the Earth and the
Moon, they must affect each other according to a reciprocal law, such as
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Newton’s law of gravity. It is through lawful connections in the “manifold
of appearances” that we are able to think of appearances as perceptions of
a self-existent system of causally evolving (and thus re-identifiable) objects,
from which we, the experiencing subjects, can remove ourselves.
In Bohr’s time and the cultural environment in which he lived, Kant’s
theory of science still exercised considerable influence. There is no doubt in
my mind that the conceptual framework staked out by Kant,i providing the
general structure for a language of objects that is independent of subjects,
is the very framework that undergirds the “plain, unambiguous language”
on the use of which Bohr so forcefully insisted:
The argument is simply that by the word “experiment” we refer
to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and
what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the ex-
perimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must
be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of
the terminology of classical physics.55
One day during tea at his institute, Bohr was sitting next to Edward Teller
and Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker. As von Weizsa¨cker recalls,56 when Teller
suggested that “after a longer period of getting accustomed to quantum the-
ory we might be able after all to replace the classical concepts by quantum
theoretical ones,” Bohr listened, apparently absent-mindedly, and said at
last: “Oh, I understand. We also might as well say that we are not sitting
here and drinking tea but that all this is merely a dream.” If we are dream-
ing, we are unable to tell others what we have done and what we have
learned. And so
it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the
atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts
of classical physics by new conceptual forms. . . . the recognition of
the limitation of our forms of perception by no means implies that
we can dispense with our customary ideas or their direct verbal
expressions when reducing our sense impressions to order.57
[I]n spite of their limitation, we can by no means dispense with
those forms of perception which colour our whole language and in
terms of which all experience must ultimately be expressed.41
iCf. Bohr: “When speaking of a conceptual framework, we merely refer to an unambigu-
ous logical representation of relations between experiences”.54
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As Heisenberg put it,58 “[t]here is no use in discussing what could be done if
we were other beings than we are”.j Bohr’s claim that the classical language
was indispensable, has been vindicated by the subsequent developments in
particle physics:
This [claim] has remained valid up to the present day. At the in-
dividual level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on
photographs, all measurement results have to be expressed in clas-
sical terms. Indeed, the use of the familiar physical quantities of
length, time, mass, and momentum–energy at a subatomic scale is
due to an extrapolation of the language of classical physics to the
non-classical domain.60
It is therefore an irony that Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing for the necessary
validity and unlimited reach of classical concepts, regarded complementar-
ity as an alternative to Kant’s theory of science, thus drawing the battle
lines in a way which put Kant and himself on opposing sides. Just as Kant
did not argue for the universal validity of Euclidean geometry in particu-
lar (see Note c), nor for Galilean relativity in particular (see Note d), so
his arguments did not, in effect, establish the unlimited reach of classical
concepts. As his arguments merely established the validity of whichever ge-
ometry, and whichever principle of relativity, was the most convenient, so
they merely established the necessary validity of classical concepts. What
Kant did not anticipate was the possibility of empirical knowledge that did
not involve the organization of sense-impressions into objects—an empirical
knowledge that, while being obtained by means of sense-impressions orga-
nized into objects, was not a knowledge of sense-impressions organized into
objects. Yet Kant was absolutely right in insisting on the necessary validity
of classical concepts, and so was Bohr when he insisted that “the quantum-
mechanical formalism . . . represents a purely symbolic scheme permitting
only predictions . . . as to results obtainable under conditions specified by
means of classical concepts”.47
jHeisenberg was of the view that the intuition of other beings, and hence their concepts,
could be different from ours: “It is in fact quite plausible that for certain primitive animals
space and time are different from what Kant calls our ‘pure intuition’ of space and time.
The latter may belong to the species ‘man,’ but not to the world as independent of
men”.59
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9. The intervening years
Whereas for Bohr “the physical content of quantum mechanics” was “ex-
hausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations
obtained under conditions specified in plain language”,61 John von Neu-
mann62 developed the mathematical part of the theory into an autonomous
formal language. In doing so he turned the theory into a mathematical for-
malism in need of a physical interpretation.
What has now become a growth industry took shape in the 1950s. First
David Bohm presented his hidden-variables interpretation,63 then Hugh
Everett put forward his relative-state interpretation,64 and then Heisen-
berg entered the fray, arguing that the Copenhagen interpretation was the
only viable interpretation.65 He thereby transformed Bohr’s views into just
another interpretation of a mathematically formulated theory. Historically,
Bohr’s reply66 to the argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen67 was
taken as a definitive refutation by the physics community. During the “shut
up and calculate” period of the post-war years, Bohr’s perspective was lost.
His paper, which only treated the mathematical formalism in a footnote, is
now seen as missing the point.
By transmogrifying a probability algorithm—the “state” vector—into a
bona fide physical state, adopting the eigenvalue–eigenstate link,k and mod-
eling a measurement as a two-stage process (“pre-measurement” followed
by “objectification”), von Neumann created what is commonly known as
the measurement problem but is more appropriately called “the disaster
of objectification”.69 This is how quantum mechanics came to be labeled
as “the great scandal of physics”,70 as a theory that “makes absolutely
no sense”,71 and as “the silliest” of all the theories proposed in the 20th
century.72
What is responsible for these mischaracterizations should not be hard
to detect: think of a quantum state’s dependence on time as the time-
dependence of an evolving physical state, rather than as the dependence of
probabilities on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of
which they are assigned, and you have two modes of evolution whereas in
reality there is not even one.
Yet today the reasons for these mischaracterizations are hard to detect.
kThus formulated by Dirac:68 “The expression that an observable ‘has a particular value’
for a particular state is permissible in quantum mechanics in the special case when a
measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so that the state
is an eigenstate of the observable.”
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One of these reasons is the axiomatic method by which quantum mechan-
ics is typically taught nowadays.l First students are told that the state of a
quantum-physical system is (or is represented by) a normalized element of
a Hilbert space. Then they are told that observables are (or are represented
by) self-adjoint operators, and that the possible outcomes of a measurement
are the eigenvalues of such an operator. Then comes a couple of axioms con-
cerning the time evolution of states—unitary between measurements and
in accordance with the projection postulate at the time of a measurement.
A further axiom stipulates that the states of composite systems are (or are
represented by) vectors in the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the
component systems. And finally, almost as an afterthought, there comes
an axiom about probabilities, the Born rule. This is how the The Ashgate
Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics70 comes to distinguish
between the “bare quantum formalism,” described as “an elegant piece of
mathematics” that is “prior to any notion of probability, measurement etc.,”
and the “quantum algorithm,” described as “an ill-defined and unattractive
mess,” whose business it is to extract “empirical results” from the former.
In actual fact, there is no bare quantum formalism. Every single axiom of
the theory only makes sense as a feature of a probability calculus.74
There can be no denying that progress was made in the years between
the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism, even enormous progress,
but it concerned the development of complex, sophisticated, and astonish-
ingly accurate probability algorithms, as well as the emergence of exciting
quantum technologies. Yet with regard to the philosophical foundations, the
progress made consisted chiefly in finding out what does not work.
10. Enter QBism
To the QBist, all probabilities are of the subjective, personalist Bayesian
kind. They reside in the mind of the individual user (of quantum mechanics)
or agent (in a quantum world). So does the compendium of probabilities
lAnother reason is this: While a junior-level classical mechanics course devotes a consid-
erable amount of time to different formulations of classical mechanics, even graduate-level
courses often emphasize one particular formulation of quantum mechanics almost to the
exclusion of all variants, of which there are (at least) nine.73 It would seem reasonable
to expect that an interpretation of quantum mechanics be based on features that are
common to all formulations of the theory, not on the mathematical idiosyncrasies of a
particular formulation, such as the wave-function formulation. What is common to all
formulations is that they afford tools for calculating correlations between measurement
outcomes.
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that goes by the name “quantum state.” And so do the events to which,
as well as the data on the basis of which, probabilities are assigned. A
measurement is any action a user takes to elicit one of a set of possible
personal experiences. Such an action does not have to take place in a physics
laboratory. It “can be anything from running across the street at L’E´toile in
Paris (and gambling upon one’s life) to a sophisticated quantum information
experiment (and gambling on the violation of a Bell inequality)”.75 The only
thing a QBist “does not model with quantum mechanics is her own direct
internal awareness of her own private experience”.76
The immediate advantage this buys the QBist over the “Newmanniac”
or the “Ψ-ontologist” is her immunity to the disaster of objectification.
The incontestable definiteness of experience implies the incontestable def-
initeness of measurement outcomes. Two of the pseudo-problems that a
quantum-state realist has to contend with are thus taken care of: the mat-
ter of Wigner’s friend77 and the matter of Bell’s shifty split.78
In Wigner’s scenario, his friend (F ) has performed a measurement on a
system S with the help of an apparatus A. While for F the combined system
S+A gets reduced when she becomes aware of the outcome, for Wigner the
combined system S+A+F gets reduced when he is informed of the outcome
by F . Wigner’s scenario led him to conclude that the theory of measurement
was logically consistent only “so long as I maintain my privileged position
as ultimate observer.” For a QBist, Wigner’s state assignment, which is
based on his past and (foreseeable) future experiences, is as “correct” as
his friend’s, based as that is on a different set of past and (foreseeable)
future experiences.
The so-called Heisenberg cut (Bell’s “shifty split”) is what separates
the system under investigation from the means of investigation. While for
Heisenberg the location of the cut was more or less arbitrary, for Bohr it
was determined by the measurement setup.m Because nothing guarantees
the definiteness of outcome-indicating properties like the incontestable def-
initeness of experience, in the QBist story the experience of the individual
user takes the place of the measurement setup. Hence, there are as many
splits as there are users, and there is nothing shifty about them. As Mermin
explains,80
Each split is between an object (the world) and a subject (an
agent’s irreducible awareness of her or his own experience). Setting
mSee Camilleri and Schlosshauer79 for a discussion of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s divergent
views on this matter.
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aside dreams or hallucinations, I, as agent, have no trouble making
such a distinction, and I assume that you don’t either. Vagueness
and ambiguity only arise if one fails to acknowledge that the splits
reside not in the objective world, but at the boundaries between
that world and the experiences of the various agents who use quan-
tum mechanics.
While we may disregard the philosophically dubious concept of awareness
of one’s own experience, the ambiguity of the expression “objective world”
must be resolved before QBism can rightfully claim consistency. Granted
that the split does not reside in the objective world, there remains the
question as to the intension of the expression. Which does Mermin have in
mind? The world of the internal realist, which originates in our respective
“spheres of consciousness”—the part of our experience that is amenable to
objectivation, about which we can think as if it existed independently of
our thoughts and perceptions, though in reality it does not? Or the world
on which we act with our instruments? The ambiguity comes into sharper
focus when Mermin writes (emphasis added) that
[s]cience is a collaborative human effort to find, through our indi-
vidual actions on the world and our verbal communications with
each other, a model for what is common to all of our privately
constructed external worlds.
Those who reject QBism . . . reify the common external world we
have all negotiated with each other, purging from the story any
reference to the origins of our common world in the private expe-
riences we try to share with each other through language.3
This means that there is another world, besides the common external world
we have all negotiated with each other, namely the world on which we act.
We must bear in mind that QBists regard the measuring apparatus as “an
extension of the agent himself . . . like a prosthetic hand”,75 and that, for
them, quantum mechanics is “a theory of stimulation and response”:
The agent, through the process of quantum measurement stimu-
lates the world external to himself. The world, in return, stim-
ulates a response in the agent that is quantified by a change in
his beliefs—i.e., by a change from a prior to a posterior quantum
state. Somewhere in the structure of those belief changes lies quan-
tum theory’s most direct statement about what we believe of the
world as it is without agents.81
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The world the agent touches with his prosthetic hand is not our common
external world, for the latter contains the agent’s prosthetic hand. It is the
unspeakable world “as it is without agents,” which only becomes speakable
through the manner in which it is stimulated (i.e., by saying in ordinary
language what the agent has done) and through the manner in which it
responds (i.e., by saying in ordinary language what the agent has learned).
11. “Outsourcing” the split
Thus there is another boundary at which the Heisenberg cut can be placed.
This too does not reside in the objective world—the objectified world, the
world of sense impressions organized into objects, the world we have all
negotiated with each other. As there is a “near” boundary to this world
(between it and the private experiences in which it originates), so there is
a “far” boundary to it (between it and the world as it is without agents).
This calls into question the wisdom of treating “all physical systems
in the same way, including atoms, beam splitters, Stern-Gerlach magnets,
preparation devices, measurement apparatuses, all the way to living be-
ings and other agents”.82 To be sure, that Wigner and his friend make
objectively incompatible state assignments is and remains no cause for con-
cern; an objective quantum state remains as much an oxymoron as a user-
independent probability. But if an agent has firm reasons to believe that
an outcome is present in another agent’s experience, he has equally firm
reasons to believe that an outcome exists in our common external world. If
a sane, healthy, and honest user has learned the value of a quantum observ-
able, he will communicate it to anyone who cares to ask. It is immaterial
if that value exists solely in his mind or in the minds of two, two hundred,
or two million users. Wigner has every right to assign to the combined sys-
tem S+A+F an incoherent mixture (representing his ignorance of what his
friend has found) once he is certain that she has obtained (experienced)
an outcome. If QBists seem unwilling to accept this, the reason can only
be that they take it to mean placing the Heisenberg cut slap-bang in the
middle of the objective world. What it actually means is placing the cut at
the far boundary of that world.
Kant was the first to make our common external world the subject
of empirical science. Beyond it lay the empirically inaccessible thing or
world in itself, a transcendent reality which had the power to affect us in
such a way that we have the sensations that we do, and that we are able
to organize our sensations into objects that interact with each other and
change in accordance with laws of nature.
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Bohr was the first to realize that empirical knowledge need not be lim-
ited to what is accessible to our senses, and that therefore it does not have
to be solely a knowledge of interacting, re-identifiable objects and causally
connected events. But he also realized that what was not directly accessi-
ble to our senses could not be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience, and thus could not be expected to be
describable in any language we can understand. What remained capable
of being so described was the experimental context, the holistic quantum
phenomenon.
And QBism is the first theory of science that tackles the mystery of
the relation between our common external world and the world in itself:
“Somewhere in the structure of those belief changes lies quantum theory’s
most direct statement about what we believe of the world as it is without
agents.” And it does this in a way nobody before them appears to have
thought of—without positing a correspondence between the two realities,
without inserting an evolving ontological state between the “fixation of the
initial state” and the test of “the possible predictions as regards subsequent
observable properties” (as the Newmanniac does), and without attempting
to explain correlata in terms of their correlations (as the Ψ-ontologist does).
This is no mean achievement.
12. Coda
To the irony of Bohr’s drawing the battle lines in a way which put Kant
and himself on opposing sides, we must now add the irony of QBists’ draw-
ing the battle lines in a way which puts Bohr and themselves on opposing
sides, notwithstanding that “QBism agrees with Bohr that the primitive
concept of experience is fundamental to an understanding of science”.76
Two things appear to be responsible for this: (i) the fact that presently
“Bohr’s unique views are almost universally either overlooked completely
or distorted beyond recognition”,83 which cannot but have adversely af-
fected QBists’ appreciation of Bohr, and (ii) their misunderstanding the
role that experimental arrangements played in Bohr’s epistemology,n tak-
ing them to be reified experiences purged of “any reference to the origins
of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with each
other through language”.3 (Recall the reason, indicated in Sec. 6, why Bohr
ceased to refer to “our forms of perception” at about the time he began to
nAs in “the Copenhagen view that measurement outcomes belong to an objective (‘clas-
sical’) domain that is independent of agents and/or their experience”.76
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speak of “experimental arrangements.”) When Bohr wrote that the descrip-
tion of atomic phenomena has “a perfectly objective character,” it was “in
the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer” (em-
phasis added).84 What Bohr understands by objectivity is “a description by
means of a language common to all . . . in which people may communicate
with each other in the relevant field”.85
In a misguided attempt to contrast the use of language made by QBists
with that made by Bohr, Mermin contends that in QBism language merely
serves to compare “our privately constructed external worlds”: “Language is
the only means by which different users of quantum mechanics can attempt
to compare their own private experiences”.3 There is no such thing as a
privately constructed external world. Nobody can construct an external
world all by himself. Before users can compare their private experiences,
they must be able formulate them, and this they cannot do unless they
already are in possession of a common language, a shared repertoire of
concepts. How could Alice tell Bob that she has the experience of a table
if they do not have a shared knowledge of the proper use of the word
“table”? Our common language and “the common external world we have
all negotiated with each other” have evolved in tandem.
Finally, there is the strange claim that quantum mechanics is “explicitly
local in the QBist interpretation”.76 According to Fuchs,86
[QBism] gives each quantum state a home. Indeed, a home local-
ized in space and time—namely, the physical site of the agent who
assigns it! By this method, one expels once and for all the fear that
quantum mechanics leads to “spooky action at a distance.”
A quantum state has its home in an agent’s mind, not at any physical
site—which could only be a site in our common external world, since in
“the world as it is without agents” there are no agents. No less a person
than Schro¨dinger, who according to the QBist triumvirate Fuchs, Mermin,
and Schack took “a QBist view” of science,76 explained why inserting minds
into our common external world, is a bad idea. By the very fact that we treat
some of our experiences as aspects of a shared external world, we exclude
ourselves from this world: “We step with our own person back into the
part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very
procedure becomes an objective world”.87 If we then mistake the mind’s
creation for a mind-independent real world, we are left with no choice but
to re-insert the mind in that world: “I so to speak put my own sentient self
(which had constructed this world as a mental product) back into it—with
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the pandemonium of disastrous logical consequences” that flow from this
error, such as “our fruitless quest for the place where mind acts on matter
or vice-versa.”
It is strange indeed to hear a QBist voice the idea that spooky action at
a distance is something to be feared. To banish it by claiming that quan-
tum mechanics is local is to concede way too much to those who fancy
themselves as modeling a reality not of their own making. Diachronic cor-
relations are as inexplicable as synchronic ones. We know (and can know)
as little of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to
determine the probability of a later event here as we know (and can know)
of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to deter-
mine the probability of a distant event now. That the transmogrification of
correlations into explanations has never been more than a sleight of hand,
should be especially obvious when the correlata are viewed as responses
from a reality beyond the far boundary of our common external world.
These strictures are by no means detrimental to the QBist enterprise.
They are included here as a friendly exhortation for QBists to be more
consistent in expressing their views. Instead of saying, for example, that
QBism is explicitly local, they would be better off saying that it is neither
local nor nonlocal in the realist’s sense of these terms.
What I would like to say in concluding is that QBists have much to learn
from Bohr, once they put aside their misconceptions about his views. Bohr’s
views, rightly understood, can greatly help in clarifying and defending the
QBist position. In order to preserve the Kantian decontextualization of
the experienced world—the ability to organize sensations into objects from
which the experiencing subject can remove itself—Bohr switched from talk-
ing about our forms of perception to talking about experimental arrange-
ments, and he substituted phenomena for objects as the principal referents
of atomic physics. Yet he never lost sight of the universal context of human
experience. QBism, through its emphasis on the individual experiencing
subject, brings home the intersubjective constitution of our common ex-
ternal world more forcefully than Bohr did. (The time wasn’t ripe for this
then. Perhaps it is now.) If measurements are irreversible and outcomes
definite, it is because the experiences of each subject are irreversible and
definite. Bohr, on the other hand, gave us all the arguments we need to
extend to our common external world the irreversibility of measurements
and the definiteness of outcomes.
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Appendix: The Born rule according to QBism
If quantum theory is so closely allied with probability theory, why is
it not written in a language that starts with probability, rather than
a language that ends with it? — Christopher A. Fuchs86
For QBists, quantum mechanics is a generalization of the Bayesian theory
of probability. It is a calculus of consistency—a set of criteria for testing
coherence between beliefs that are relevant to rational decision making. As
there are no external criteria for declaring a probability judgment right
or wrong, so there are no external criteria for declaring a quantum state
assignment right or wrong. The only criterion for the adequacy of a proba-
bility judgment or a state assignment is internal coherence between beliefs.
The Born rule therefore is not simply a rule for updating probabilities, for
getting new ones from old. It is a rule for relating probability assignments
and constraining them. As such, it can be expressed entirely in terms of
probabilities.
The proof of the last claim requires the use of positive operator valued
measures (POVMs), which are generalizations of the standard projector
valued measures used by von Neumann62 and Dirac.68 It goes like this:
While a density operator ρ determines a potentially infinite number of
probabilities, these cannot all be independent. On a d-dimensional Hilbert
space, ρ is completely determined by the d 2 probabilities it assigns to the
outcomes (represented by linearly independent positive operators Ei) of an
informationally complete measurement. Any density operator ρ therefore
corresponds to a vector whose d 2 components are the Born probabilities
pi = Tr(ρEi) , (1)
and any POVM {Fj} corresponds to a matrix whose elements are the con-
ditional probabilities
Rji = Tr(ΠiFj) , (2)
where the Πi are 1-dimensional projectors proportional to Ei. This makes
it possible to write the Born rule in the generic form
q(Fj) = f
(
{Rji}, {pi}
)
, (3)
where f depends on the details of the informationally complete measure-
ment {Ei}.
The function f takes a particularly simple form if the positive operators
Ei constitute a symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement.
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In this case one of the ways in which the Born rule can be written is86,88
q(Fj) =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1) pi −
1
d
]
Rji . (4)
If the positive operators Fj are mutually orthogonal projectors representing
the outcomes of a complete von Neumann measurement, the Born rule takes
the even simpler form
q(Fj) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
Rjipi − 1 . (5)
While the probabilities (4) and (5) are expressed in terms of (i) the prob-
abilities pi that an agent assigns to the possible outcomes of the SIC mea-
surement and (ii) the conditional probabilities Rji that the agent assigns to
the possible outcomes of a subsequent measurement if the SIC measurement
is actually made, they pertain to a situation in which the SIC measurement
is not made. If it is made, the law of total probability applies, and we have
that
q(Fj) =
d2∑
i=1
Rjipi . (6)
Comparing Eqs. (4) and (5) with Eq. (6), one can see that “[t]he Born Rule
is nothing but a kind of Quantum Law of Total Probability! No complex
amplitudes, no operators—only probabilities in, and probabilities out”.86
QBists hope to eventually be in a position to derive the standard
Hilbert space formalism from the Born rule. And they hope so to distill
the essence of quantum mechanics and the essential characteristic of the
quantum world.o This a fascinating, highly ambitious, and seriously chal-
lenging project. Do SIC measurements even exist? Unfortunately, proofs of
their existence are elusive. As of May 2017, such proofs have been found for
all dimensions up to d=151, and for a few others up to 323.75 The mood of
the QBist community nevertheless is that a SIC measurement should exist
for every finite dimension. That said, it must be stressed that the general
form of the Born rule, Eq. (3), does not depend on the existence of SIC
measurements; it only presupposes informationally complete POVMs, and
these are known to exist for all finite dimensions.
oWhile the Born rule is normative—it guides an agent’s behavior in a world that is
fundamentally quantum—it is also an empirical rule. It is a statement about the quantum
world, indirectly expressed as a calculus of consistency for bets placed on the outcomes
of measurements.
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